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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 47

HABEAS CoRPus-FEDERAL CouRTS-EXHAusnoN oF STATE REMEDIEs-Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, alleging denial of due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, was quashed on the merits by an inferior Florida
court whose action was affirmed without opinion by the Florida Supreme Court.
It was impossible to ascertain whether the affirmance was on the merits or on the
ground that, under Florida law, habeas corpus was not the proper procedure to
raise the due process issue. A later decision by the Florida Supreme Court clearly
established that the prior case had been decided on the merits of the constitutional
question, and that habeas corpus was available in Florida to raise the due process
issue.1 Petitioner did not seek review of the Florida court's decision by certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, but later instituted habeas corpus proceedings in a federal district court which ordered his release. On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held, the district court had properly exercised its
discretion to issue the writ. Four justices dissented on the ground that, because
petitioner had failed to exhaust his "state remedies," the constitutional question was
not properly before the court. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270
(1948).2
Considerations of respect for state judicial processes, administrative necessities
of federal courts, and the fact that state as well as federal courts are charged with
protection of federal rights, have dictated self-imposed limitations on the power
of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus. Consequently, to secure the writ
from a federal district court, a petitioner must make a substantial showing of a

Johnson v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 264, 28 S. (2d) 585 (1946).
For a discussion of the substantive problem involved in the principal case, the right of
an indigent accused to counsel in a non-capital state case, see note on Bute v. lliinois, supra,
p. 705.
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•de,tiial of a federal right, and must also show that all state remedies available,
which include all appellate remedies in state courts and in the United States
Supreme Court by appeal or certiorari, have been exhausted.3 The few exceptions
to this rule, "rare cases of peculiar urgency," fall within well defined categories. 4
While the facts in the principal case do not bring it within one of the recognized
exceptions to the rule, it is submitted that the case was correctly decided. Appeal
of petitioner's conviction to the Florida Supreme Court would have been useless,
in view of the decision of that court on the merits in the habeas corpus proceeding. u His failue to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court appears
excusable since, had application been made, it would almost certainly have been
denied, for at that time it was not clear that the state court's decision was on the
merits, and certiorari will not be granted if adequate state grounds for the decision
appear. 0 As the Court points out, denial of the writ of habeas corpus under these
circumstances would leave petitioner "completely remediless, having been unable
to secure relief from the Florida courts and being barred from invoking federal
aid." 7 Furthermore, the decision in the principal case does not seriously impair
the valuable certainty of the exhaustion rule, since petitioner had secured a decision on the merits by the highest state court, thµs satisfying the reason for the rule.
In addition, the district court is free to weigh the failure to apply for certiorari
against the injustice which would result from a denial of the writ. Since federal
judges sparingly
exercise their discretion to grant habeas corpus, 8 it is submitted
,
that the principal case infuses desirable flexibility into the exhaustion of state
remedies requirement° without destroying it as a guide to the use, by state prisoners, of the writ of habeas corpus in federal courts.

E. W. Rothe, Jr:
3 Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. ll4 at 116, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1943). For an excellent review
of the authorities, see Guy v. Utecht, (C.C.A. 8th, 1944), 144 F. (2d) 913; and Ex parte
Roberts, (D.C. W.Va. 1945) 61 F. Supp. 864.
4 Peculiar urgency is recognized where: (I) the state affords no remedy to raise the
constitutional qµestion; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935); (2) the
remedy afforded by state law was, in actual practice, unavailabl"e or failed to provide a full
and fair adjudication of federal questions; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265
(1923); (3) the state improperly interfered with the functions of the federal government. In
Re Neagle, 135 U.S. l, IO S.Ct. 658 (1890).
5 Furthermore, the time allowed by Florida law for an appeal had elapsed. See Williams
v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 65 S.Ct. 363 (1945);Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019
(1938). However, the co:ri.tention that petitioner should be denied relief because he had
failed to appeal his conviction finds support in Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393, 44 S.Ct. 525
(1924); Woods v. Nierstherheimer, 328 U.S. 2ll, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946).
6 Williams v. Kaiser, supra, note 5; White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 65 S.Ct. 978 (1945).
7 Principal case at 682.
8 Less than two percent of the habeas corpus petitions filed in federal district courts
from 1943 to 1945 resulted in a reversal of the conviction and a release of the prisoner. Principal case at 682. But see Howard v. Dowd, (D.C. Ind. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 844.
9 See 47 l\,hcH. L. REv. 72 (1948), discussing the need for such Hexibility because of
injustice often produced by a rigid requirement of exhaustion of state remedies.

